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Transforming traditional agricultural economy into modern economic growth path is the main 
theme of economic development. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, we find that the 
key of transformation is to raise the economic value of people, to improve human capital in-
vestment and to match the stocks of physical and human capital. China’s rural economy is on 
the edge of economic takeoff, and different zones may pursue different paths for transforma-
tion. The source of rural poverty is not the scarcity of income or consumption, but the defi-
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During the past two centuries, the discussion on the causation and sources of economic 
growth has been one of the most intriguing and fascinating fields in mainstream economic 
theory, while the practice of transforming traditional agricultural economy into modern econ-
omy also differed drastically around the world. In short, the modern economic growth means 
the economy enjoys the increasing capability of providing more and better goods and services 
for household, and the increasing capability is based upon the corresponding change in insti-
tutional foundation and ideology. In other words, the key to economic growth lies in the sus-
tainable improvement of living standard and welfare through constant technological and insti-
tutional innovation. 
Kuznets (1973) specified six characteristics for modern economic growth: high growth 
rate for per capita GDP; high input-output ratio; fast transform in economic structure; fast 
change in social structure and ideology; technological change and diffusion; The coexistence 
of few developed economies and a huge number of less developed economies, where more 
than 3/4 of world population living in the situation much lower than the level permitted by the 
technology possibility. We also observed, most LDCs are still involved in the framework of 
traditional agricultural economy, and suffering from the very low level of per capita GDP and 
living standard. The transform from the traditional agricultural economy to modern economic 
growth path includes transform from agricultural to non-agricultural activities, transform from 
separated agricultural to integrated non-individual economy, and transform of the statue of 
traditional peasants.  
Yet, as Schultz (1993) said: “The economic growth starting from traditional agricultural 
economy is rather costly.” The traditional agricultural economy has existed for hundreds or 
even thousands of years, while the history of modern economy is much shorter. Actually from 
the viewpoint of make full use of the available opportunity and resources, the peasants in tra-
ditional agricultural economy are much closer to “optimum” and “steady-state” than those in 
modern economy, because the modern peasants (farmers) have to adjust frequently to the 
changing technology and market situation. The traditional economy usually stagnates in pov-
erty, while the modern economy is growing constantly. In short, the traditional economy is 
stable and near equilibrium, while the modern economy is unstable and out of equilibrium. 
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What is more, the “equilibrium” of traditional economy is surely to be broken, the transform 
into modern economy or industrialization is the theme of economic development.  
How to transform traditional economy? The question has been hotly discussed in litera-
tures. Some regard the main point of transform as the accumulation of physical capital; some 
others think it is more important to coordinate population growth and economic growth. In 
this paper, I think the key to transforming traditional economy lies in increasing the economic 
value of people, increasing investment in human capital, and matching the physical capital 
and human capital. The source of rural poverty in China is not the shortage of income or con-
sumption, but the “capability poverty” induced by the scarcity of education, social insurance, 
health, medicare and economic opportunity in rural China.  
1. The Literature 
During a long period, on the one hand, the growth level and growth rates differ across 
economies, some economies stay as leaders, some surpass the former developed economies, 
some stagnate and lose the prosperity. On the other hand, all the now developed economies 
were once in under-developed stage. Rostow (1960) describes the society into five different 
kinds: traditional, pre-take off, take off, moving to maturity and mass consumption. “Take-
off” is the most important stage and milestone, which means “the hindrance and pressure of 
stable growth has been overcome”, “growth has become the normal situation”. Yet take-off is 
rather abnormal, because the beginning of take-off can always be reduced to an extremely 
strong stimulus, which means “If you desire an economic success, the resources involved in 
development program should reach a minimal level. To push an economy into self-sustaining 
growth is just like to push an airplane into sky. A critical minimal speed is necessary for a 
successful take-off” (Rostow, 1960). However, how to endow an economy such a push that is 
strong enough for a take-off, is still unsolved and under investigation. 
One influential point stresses the importance of physical capital accumulation. Rostow 
(1960) puts forward three basic conditions for a take-off: the first is to raise the ratio of pro-
ductive investment to GDP from about 5% or less to more than 10%; the second is to set up 
one or more fast-growing manufacturers; the third is to form market-friendly political, social 
and institutional structure. Generally, the premise of take-off lies in the initial capability of 
rearranging domestic savings, internalizing the externality of investment and remaining high 
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marginal saving rate, while the sharp increase of productive investment is regarded as the 
most fundamental condition and criteria for take-off. Lewis (1955) also mentions there was 
little difference between an expanding and a shrinking economy in their income distribution, 
yet how much of the wealth has been invested productively makes a big difference. 
The Big-Push theory (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943) deserves emphasizing. It says, the East 
and East-south Europe countries (then less developed) should not depend on slow self-
satisfied industrialization; on the contrary, they could push a large-scale one-shot industriali-
zation based upon the international specialization and the complementary effect among indus-
trial sectors. Strange as it seems to be, the theory is based upon the famous theory of increas-
ing returns and the indivisibility of investment (Allyn Young, 1928). If several sectors of an 
economy adopt increasing-return technology simultaneously, the income generated by each 
sector will provides demand for other sectors, thus expands the reciprocal market, therefore 
industrialization will be realized through “an integrating simultaneous big-push”. Nurkse 
(1953), Scitovsky (1954) and Fleming (1955) develop similar theories; their main idea can be 
summarized as: an economy can benefit from industrialization through a jump towards the 
developed situation; the process of industrialization may not depend on any exogenous en-
dowment and technology progress, it can be pushed only by investing in all sectors. Mur-
phy,Shleifer & Vishny (1989) formulates the above idea and points out while taking up in-
creasing-return technology, the spill-over effect of aggregate demand will induce an expan-
sion of market scale, and result in a big-push style industrialization. Although the big-push 
theory seems to be perfect, the problems come from real world. The big-push strategy and 
high, wide-ranged investment may last as long as 20-25 years to fulfill industrialization, 
which sounds rather impractical for capital-lacking LDCs. 
Another approach to transform starts from Malthusian theory of population trap. The 
point is the reason for poverty in LDCs lies in the low per capita GDP and insufficient capital 
formation, thus there is so-called “the trap of low level equilibrium” and “the vicious cycle of 
poverty”. To break the stalemate, what is needed is not only an increase in per capita GDP, 
but also an increase large enough to surpass some “critical minimal effort” level (Leibenstein, 
1954). Galor & Weil (2000) combines economic growth, population and technological pro-
gress into a formal model. The growth path is regarded as three stages: the first is Malthusian 
stage which is specified as slow technological progress and stable extremely low level of per 
capital income. The second is post-Malthusian stage which is specified as slowly increasing 
technology and per capita income. The third is modern growth stage which is specified as low 
and even negative population growth and high increase in technology and per capita GDP. 4 
They also investigate the reason for transform from one stage to another. One reason is the 
increase of population and average education level stimulate knowledge accumulation and 
technological progress. Another reason is technological progress creates a non-equilibrium 
situation which makes the return to human capital relatively higher, and induces people to 
improve the quality instead of quantity of their offspring, that is the growth of population de-
creases while the accumulation of human capital increases. Hansen & Prescott (1998) also 
wants to formulate the transform towards modern economy. They think as long as the TFP is 
positive, the transform will be inevitable. There is one product, two technologies in their 
model. One Malthusian technology needs labor, land and capital as inputs, another Solow 
technology does not need land. During the earlier stage, only the Malthusian technology is 
used, growth rate stagnates for a long time due to the decreasing returns and population 
growth. Then comes the stage in which both technologies are used, per capita income in-
creases slowly as a result. In the end, only Solow technology is used economy-wide, and high 
sustainable growth can be observed. Therefore the transform from traditional agricultural 
economy to modern economy is a natural evolution. 
Another approach to analyzing the transform in LDCs concentrates on the multiple pos-
sible equilibria and the determination of final equilibrium. Once the increasing returns and 
positive externality are taken into account, the economic growth will differ from traditional 
model. Ethier (1982a, 1982b) prove the externality makes the form of international trade 
changeable, returns from trade uncertain, and the monopolistic competition in intermediate 
goods market will result in externality in final goods market. Romer (1986) thinks the possi-
ble existence of externality makes it unnecessary to separate the factor contribution and tech-
nology contribution in growth; he also extends the idea that increasing return will push accu-
mulated growth across sectors, and set up an endogenous growth model. Krugman (1981, 
1987) formulate the “unbalance-growth” model based upon externality, where the world 
economy is endogenously separated into rich and poor groups. The specialization induced by 
some history accidence will be “lock-in” through learning, thus occur multiple equilibria. The 
next problem is what kind of equilibrium will be chosen? Some think history does matter that 
is the initial situation will determine the final choice. Some others emphasize the importance 
of expectation. They think once people have set up some expectation about future, the expec-
tation will be self-fulfilling. Krugman (1991) introduces externality and adjustment costs into 
growth model, and concludes that history and expectation will play relatively important role 
across economies. Matsuyama (1991) proves that because of the increasing returns in manu-
factures, the multiple equilibria can not by explained only by history. If people can coordinate 5 
their expectation properly, then industrialization may occur as a result. On the one hand, the 
self-fulfilling optimistic expectation can make take-off possible; on the other hand, even if the 
initial situation is acceptable, the self-fulfilling pessimistic expectation may result in de-
industrialization. Moreover, Mulligan & Sala-I-Martin (1993) analyzes the dynamic transition 
within a two-sector model. Xie (1994), based on Lucas (1988), set up a practical calculation 
and simulation, express the multiple equilibria and the divergence in growth explicitly. 
However, we must admit that the evolution of traditional agricultural economy has made full 
use of the resources available. On one hand, the experience and production techniques accu-
mulated by the peasants make them efficiently adjusted to their limited living environment. 
On the other hand, because the traditional economy is relatively static, knowledge learned 
from school education is of little economic value for peasants, thus there is little incentive for 
peasants to invest in human capital and get involved in creative activities. Therefore, the only 
feasible way to break the low level equilibrium of traditional economy and realize the trans-
form to high level equilibrium is to raise the economic value of human, increase human capi-
tal investment and make it match the accumulation of physical capital. 
2. The low level equilibrium of traditional economy and possible paths for evolution 
Before industrialization, traditional economy was banded with land-based agriculture. 
Most population were involved in agriculture, whose living location was determined by 
whether the area was favorable for agriculture. There was little mobility of labor or any other 
resources. Simply speaking, we regard traditional economy as complete agricultural economy. 
Because of the limitation and non-productivity of land, traditional economy is subject not 
only to decreasing returns to production factors, but also to decreasing returns to scale. Sup-
pose the land is normalizing to 1, population L increases at n annually, i.e. 
nt
t e L L
− = 0 . Sup-
pose the production function is of the fixed-proportion form, and subject to constant returns to 
scale: 
Y=min(AK,BL)                                                      (1) 
Where the ratio of capital to labor is fixed as B/A. The aggregate production function can be 
also written as the per capita form: 
y=f(k)=min(Ak,B)                                                    (2) 6 
The production function can be represented as the following diagram: 
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If s is saving rate, δis depreciation rate, then the capital accumulation function will be as 
follows: 
•
k =sf(k)-nk-δk                                                       (3) 
Therefore the equilibrium of the traditional economy will be determined by the Golden Rule: 
k γ =
•
k /k= [sf(k)/k]-(n+δ)=0                                         (4) 
There may be different equilibria of traditional economy. In Figure 2, no matter how 
much the per capita capital, there will always be  k γ <0, that is the per capita capital decreases, 
which may comes from too fast population growth. In the end, equilibrium per capita capital 
will converge to 0. 
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In Figure 3, equilibrium per capita capital is 




k ) will be wasted. Under this situation, instead of letting the capital unemployed, 
the traditional economy will produce more population, i.e. the (n+δ) line will move up, so that 
the equilibrium capital stock will be converge to 
−
k . 
In Figure 4, (n+δ) line is coincident with sA segment, the equilibrium capital can be any 
value between 0 and 
−
k . The economy will stagnate; the productivity will be constrained by 7 
the shortage of capital. In fact, the smaller A is compared with B, the lower the per capita 
capital used in production is. That is, the lower sA, the higher 
−
k , which means the stagnating 
segment in traditional economy will be even larger. 
How to emerge from the trap of low level equilibrium? One approach is to raise saving 
rate in economy, and remain the high saving rate for some period, which means the curve 
sf(k)/k shifts up in above figures. Another approach is to decrease population growth, and 
remain low population reproduction, which means the (n+δ) line moves down in above fig-
ures. Yet in traditional economies, most output has been used for subsistence consumption, 
the output that could be used for saving or capital accumulation is rather limited, which means 
the former approach is hard to realize. On the other hand, per capita capital is low and stable, 
in production function; A is small relative to B, which means people are more induced to re-
produce more population, so it will also be rather difficult to decrease population growth. 
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The key to getting rid of the trap of low level equilibrium is to introduce new factors into 
aggregate production function, so that the production can overcome the traditional decreasing 
return effect and can even be embedded with increasing return effect. Therefore with the same 
saving rates, output will grow increasingly as the capital input increase, i.e. there will be a 
increasing segment in the f(k)/k curve, then it will return to the normal decreasing segment. 
As Path Ⅰin Figure 5, the low level equilibrium of traditional economy is 
*
l k , where not only 
per capita GDP , but also per capita capital are very low, technology is stagnant, the output 
and population grow at the same rate. This is a stable situation, and may last for a long period. 8 
Yet the situation is surely to be broken up sooner or later for a higher level of equilibrium, 
thus is called as the “Malthusian pseudo steady state” (Galor & Weil, 2000). 
As capital increases, the curve f(k)/k moves to upward sloping segment, getting closer 
to 
*
m k . But this is not a saddle point equilibrium, because on its left, population grows faster 
than GDP, per capita capital level will drop back to 
*
l k  level. Only when per capita capital 
accumulation surpasses
*
m k , it can approach to high-level equilibrium
*
h k . Therefore with per 




m k ], capital accumulation and technology progress will acceler-
ate, yet before it surpass some critical level, the economy can not be tuned into a sustainable 
growth path. Here the 
*
m k  level acts as the “critical minimal level”. At last, with per capita 
capital higher than 
*
m k , the economy will move to sustainable growth path until the higher 
equilibrium level 
*
h k  is reached, which specifies the modern economic growth equilibrium. 
What factors determine the evolution from low-level equilibrium to high-level equilib-
rium? The most important is human capital accumulation. As human capital increases, the 
knowledge accumulates, technology progress accelerates, which can overcome the decreasing 
returns of physical capital. On the contrary, the transition will raise the returns to human capi-
tal; people will be induced to replace population quantity with higher quality. Several possible 
paths have been depicted in Figure 5. The situation corresponding to Path Ⅱ is an economy 
whose per capita physical capital is quite low as 
*
l k , while the stock of human capital is high 
(Germany and Japan after WWⅡ are examples, with physical capital destroyed by war, while 
human capital well preserved). In this situation, as long as the economy can increase physical 
capital (via high saving rate, or foreign capital etc.), it can take off quickly. Actually, 
*
l k  and 
*
m k  are coincident, pushing the economy jumping out of low level equilibrium. 
Path Ⅲ corresponds with the situation when per capita physical capital is 
*
l k , yet human 
capital is relatively more abundant. For example, some countries are rather poor, but per cap-
ita education level is quite high due to history, custom, etc. This kind of economy can balance 
its accumulation of physical and human capital, approaching to critical level. Because of the 
substitution and complementness between physical and human capital, the critical level 
*
m k  is 
closer to 
*
l k  compared with Path Ⅰ, which means a faster take-off.  9 
Path Ⅳ is the situation when per capita physical capital is approaching to but has not reached 
*
m k  level, while human capital is much lower (there are may be lots of reasons, such as educa-
tion is strictly limited by religion, or human capital is destroyed by natural disasters or epi-
demic diseases). In this case, more physical capital accumulation will not lead to a take-off. 
On the contrary, a feasible approach is to relatively decrease physical capital accumulation, 
while increasing human capital accumulation significantly, take-off may occur when the ratio 
of two capital stocks get appropriate. In sum, it is not the stock of physical capital, but the 
proportion between the stocks of physical capital and human capital, that determines whether 
an economy can take off. 
3. The Transition in Agricultural Economy: China’s Characteristics 
It is rather hard to give judgment where an economy is located on its transition path. 
Kuznets (1971) summarizes several important criteria based upon the long-run growth experi-
ence of developed countries. Two criteria deserve special attention. One is the level of per 
capita income. Most developed countries reached a higher per capita income on the verge of 
take-off. For example, per capita income of British and Swede was $217-227, per capita in-
come of pre-European Colony countries was $474-760 (1965 US$). The other is the share of 
agriculture in GDP. The share of agriculture in GDP used to be as high as 40-60%, as Ger-
many in the 19
th century, Denmark in 1970s, Italy in 1960s, USA in 1940s, Japan in 1980s. 
However, after its take-off, the share decreases sharply until it was lower than 10%. China’s 
economy is a typical dualist economy under transition, how to transform traditional agricul-
ture is the key to take-off. We will focus our attention to China’s agriculture and rural area. 
(1) Per capita output for peasants is still low, the share of agriculture in GDP is decreas-
ing, yet still not enough compared with the take-off criteria. 
Although China’s GDP surpasses 10 trillion RMB in 2002, per capita GDP is about $900 
(current price). Yet only when per capita income in rural area reaches take-off level, can the 
whole economy tune into modern growth path. Table 1 summarizes the recent situation of per 
capita income in rural China. Until 2001, per capita income in rural China is just around $190, 
much lower than what we observe in the history of developed countries. Actually the gap is 
even larger if we take into account the price difference. 10 
Table 1  Output, Population and per capita income in Rural China  








89590.3 91674.6 92819.7 93382.9 
Per capita 
income(RMB) 
559.99 1370.8 1576.3 1564.2 
Per capita 
income(US$) 
68.29 159.5 192.2 190.7 
Sources: China Agriculture Yearbook 2002, p.15 ,31 
 
























































From Figure 6, it is easy to see that both GDP and first sector output grow very slowly 
during 1952-1978. Due to the household responsibility system, the first sector output in-
creases faster and gains 4 more percentage share in GDP during 1978-1984
2. 1985-1993 wit-
ness a slow-down in agriculture, and its share in GDP decreases 8.5 percentage as a result. 
With the price reform for agriculture goods, the share of the first sector in GDP increases 
again up to 20%. Since 1997, the share has been decreasing constantly with a share of 15.2% 
in 2001. 
In the same period, the share of rural consumption in national consumption has been de-
creasing generally, with 1985-1988 as an exception. 1988-1993 witnesses the fastest decrease, 
after which the decreasing rate declines (see Figure 7). In general, agriculture is getting more 
and more unimportant in national economy. Yet the decrease of its share in output and con-
sumption is not stable or monotonic, the first sector still stands for a share much larger than 
10% in GDP. We conclude that China’s rural economy is changing and almost on the verge of 
its take-off, yet it has not reached the critical level as showed by Path Ⅰin Figure 5. 
 
 
                                                 
2Except special notation, the data come from China Agriculture Yearbook 2002 and China Peasant Investigation 
Yearbook 2002. 12 

























(2)There are still sharp gaps between urban and rural residents from the view point of their 
income and consumption, the poverty is especially serious in rural China. 
 


































Figure 8 is the time series change of per capita disposable income of urban and rural resi-
dents. In 1978-1985, per capita income of rural residents grows faster than that of urban resi-
dents, leading to a smaller gap with the later. Yet the gap has been increasing ever since, es-
pecially after 1996, when there is little increase in peasants’ income, while income of urban 
residents increases significantly. Figure 9 describes the consumption gap between urban and 13 
rural residents with rural consumption normalized as 1. The gap decreases during 1978-1984 
and 1993-1996, resulting from the household responsibility system and the raise of produce 
prices respectively. However, in 1985-1992 and the years after 1996, the gap is increasing.  
Meanwhile, the poverty is a serious problem in rural area. According to the China’s sta-
tistics, the annual per capita income is lower than 630 RMB is regarded as “absolute poverty”, 
the accidence rate of absolute poverty is 3.2%, with the poverty population as high as 29.27 
million. Actually this poverty criteria is very low, it is only equivalent to daily per capita in-
come no more than $0.22, while the World Bank defines poverty as daily per capita income 
no more than $1. According to the international criteria, the poverty number in China will be 
much larger. Moreover, most of the “absolute-poverty” people are located in rural China, es-
pecially western rural China. 62.8% of the 581 national “poverty counties” and 53.4% of pov-
erty population are located in the 12 “Big-Development” mid-western provinces. How to re-
lieve the acute and widely-spread poverty is still a serious problem and challenge to trans-
forming traditional agriculture in China. 
 
(3)The income gap within rural areas is widening, which means different areas may real-
ize their transform through different approaches. 
 
Figure 10  the divergence of per capita income: 
















There are three large regions in China: the Eastern, the Middle and the Western re-
gions
3.In my research, the per capita income diverges significantly across rural China, and 
there is no evidence that the divergence will shrink. The variances of per capita income across 
three regions are 26.7, 57.2, 131.21, 445.29, 611.93, 654.85 (RMB) in 1980, 1985, 1990, 
1995, 2000, and 2001 respectively. In Figure 10, the Eastern rural area is developing the fast-
est, while the Middle and Western rural areas are lagging behind further and further away. 
The situation of the 12 “Big-Development” mid-western provinces is getting better compared 
with the geographical Western area. The difference and divergence shows the possibility of 
transforming traditional agriculture through different approaches. 
(4)The Engle’s coefficient is decreasing in rural China, while the expenditure on medical 
care, transportation and education is increasing sharply, which may play an increasingly im-
portant role in the investment on peasants themselves. 
There is a tendency that the Engle’s coefficient will decrease with economic development 
and economic transform. Figure 11 depicts the general decreasing tendency for rural China in 
1978-2001. Yet we can also find some increasing segments (such as 1980, 1988-1990, 1991-
1995), which represents in some way the fluctuation of economic transform. Figure 12 shows 
how much the peasants are spending for medical care, transportation and education in the past 
two decades. We can find a significant increase in the spending on these items, especially on 
education, which can be interpreted as an increase in the investment on people and an increase 








                                                 
3 The Eastern region includes 12 provinces: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan. The Middle region includes9 provinces: Shanxi (taiyuan), 
Neimenggu, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan. The western region includes 10 prov-
inces: Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang, Shanxi (xi’an), Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang. Yet 15 



























































4. Transforming Traditional Agricultural Economy in China: Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we will analyze the determinants for transforming traditional agricultural 
economy in China through empirical analysis. Both time series and cross section data will be 
considered. The time series data are focused the period 1978-2001. Because China’s rural 
economy has been growing relatively faster and more stable since 1978, all the statistical data 
can be consistently obtained. “The decreasing share of the first sector output value in GDP” 
is regarded as one of the most important criteria for transform. We will use this share as inde-
                                                                                                                                                          
the 12 “big-development” mid-western provinces are: Neimenggu, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, 16 
pendent variable, i.e. if some independent variable is negatively related with the share, it will 
regarded as favorable to economic transform; on the contrary, if some variable is positively 
related with the share, it will be regarded as a hinder to economic transform. The basic regres-
sion function is as follows: 
Dummy Educa Trans Med
Engles Pindex Expen H H H H K K C A
13 12 11 10
9 8 7 5 6 3 5 1 4 0 3 2 2 1 1
α α α α
α α α α α α α α α
+ + + +
+ + + + + + + + + =
 
Where: 
A=The share of the first sector output value in GDP╳100; 
1 K =the rural collective fixed investment (billion RMB); 
2 K =the rural peasant fixed investment (billion RMB); 
5 3 1 0 , , , H H H H =within every 100 rural labor, the number of those whose education can be 
judged as “illiterate”, “primary school”, “high school”, “College or higher”
4; 
Expen=rural resident’s consumption spending (without taking account into the price factor, 
¥/person,year);  
Pindex =price index for rural production factors (with the last year normalized as 100. Be-
cause of the change in statistics standards, we can only use “price index for rural indus-
trial goods” instead for 1978-1984);  
Engles=Rural Engel’s coefficient;  
Med =rural spending on medical care (RMB/person, year);  
Trans=rural spending on transportation and post services (RMB/person, year);  
Educa=rural spending on education (RMB/person, year);  
Dummy=0 for 1978-1984; =1 for 1985-2001.  
The regression results are summarized in Table 2, with the t-statistics in the parenthesis under 
each variables. 
                                                                                                                                                          
Yunnan, Xizang, Shanxi (xi’an), Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang.  
4 In China’s national statistics, the education level of rural labor can be classified into six categories: “illiterate”, 
“primary school”, “secondary school”, “high school”, “specialized technical training school”, and “college and 
above”.  17 
Table 2  The time series regression results: 1978-2001 
  Reg. 1  Reg. 2  Reg. 3  Reg. 4  Reg. 5  Reg. 6 
C  44.752 41.417 41.249 83.194 51.212 36.343 
  (7.336) (0.646) (7.635) (1.146) (0.697) (0.551) 
K1  -0.671 -1.061 -2.509    0.265  0.337 
  (-1.525) (-2.829) (-3.914)    (0.436)  (0.619) 
K2  -1.819 -1.122 -3.683 0.994  2.064  1.835 
  (-1.690) (-1.195) (-3.805) (0.981)  (3.406)  (3.316) 
H0   0.713  0.070  0.443  0.772 
   (1.153)  (0.098)  (0.633)  (1.193) 
H1   -0.178  -0.345  -0.118  0.096 
   (-0.345)  (-0.571)  (-0.191)  (0.170) 
H3   -0.100  -0.321  -0.160  0.034 
   (-0.217)  (-0.799)  (-0.378)  (0.087) 
H5   -0.002  -0.732  -0.454  -0.189 
   (-0.003)  (-0.917)  (-0.547)  (-0.250) 
Expen  1.547 1.845 4.956 1.180     
  (1.294) (2.007) (4.379) (1.353)     
Pindex  -0.231 -0.124 -0.202 -0.223 -0.208 -0.215 
  (-2.450) (-1.105) (-2.445) (2.470) (-1.942) (-2.241) 
Engles        - 0 . 1 9 0  
        ( - 1 . 9 5 3 )  
Med     -4.001  0.410  1.035  1.193 
     (-4.587)  (0.176)  (1.013)  (1.304) 
Trans     2766  0.276  -0.319  -0.855 
     (4.705)  (0.445)  (-0.530)  (-1.416) 
Educa     1.616  -2.752  -2.863  -2.412 
     (1.789)  (-3.766)  (-2.517)  (-2.317) 
Dummy      -0.367  -0.399  -0.440 
      (-3.498)  (-3.606)  (-4.357) 
R
2  0.881 0.961 0.957 0.983 0.980 0.986 
F-statistics  33.204 43.349 47.236 56.768 49.378 57.158 
 
The above regression can result in very interesting conclusions. Firstly, if we only con-
sider the role that rural collective and peasant fixed investment play in economic transform, 
the positive effect is obvious (Regressions 1 and 3); yet when we take into account the educa-
tion levels of peasants, the effect of physical investment becomes very insignificant (Reg. 2). 18 
If we take into account more factors regarding investment on peasants themselves (such as 
spending on medical care and education), the physical investment even plays a negative role 
in economic transform (Reg. 4, 5, 6). The conclusion just testifies our point that with a low 
human capital stock, increase in physical capital may not be favorable for transforming tradi-
tional agriculture economy. 
Secondly, in each of the above regressions, the rural consumption expenditure is nega-
tively related with transform in rural areas, while the increase in price index of rural produc-
tion factors is favorable for transform. It is usually supposed that the rise of prices of rural 
production factors is unfavorable to peasants, yet from another viewpoint, the price rise actu-
ally raises the relative advantages for non-agricultural activities, thus provides more economic 
opportunities for peasants. 
Thirdly, the effect of peasants’ education levels on transform is generally insignificant, 
mainly because education affects economic activities with much longer time-lag compared 
with other variables. However, we also find out that the extremely low education level (“illit-
erate” or “primary school”) is a hinder for transform; while the higher education level (“high 
school” or “college and above”) is significantly positive to transform. 
Fourthly, within rural expenditure, the spending on medical care, transportation and edu-
cation has diverse effect upon economic transform. Basically, rural medical care expenditure 
has insignificant negative effect on transform. After the collapse of the former cooperative 
health system in rural China, peasants have to pay much more than before for routine medical 
care, many peasants even have to give up going to hospital due to the high medical costs. 
Thus the medical care spending of peasants may not reflect their invest on health. When tak-
ing into account the education levels and transportation spending in rural China, the latter 
plays a positive actor in transform, which means more mobility, more access to information is 
helpful for peasants to invest in education and training, therefore helpful for transform. The 
positive role of rural education spending on economic transform is also significant as we ex-
pect. 
In order to analyze the cross section data, we adopt the most recent statistical and investi-
gation data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics in 2001. We want to find out what de-
termine the transform paths in the 31 provinces up to now. The basic regression function is as 
follows:  
j j j j j j
j j j j j j j j j
Dummy Edu Trans Med So Expen
HOS H H H H N K C A
13 12 11 10 9 8
7 5 6 2 5 1 4 0 3 2 1
sec β β β β β β
β β β β β β β
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + + + =
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Where: 
j A =the share of the first sector output value in GDP for the jth province (j=1, 2,…, 31, as 
below)╳100; 
j K =the rural fixed investment in the jth province (billion RMB);  
j N =the rural labor force in the jth province (10 thousand);  
j H0 ,  j H1 ,  j H2 ,  j H5 =in the jth province, for each 100 rural labor, the number of those 
whose education levels are defined as “illiterate”, “primary school”, “secondary school”, 
“college and above”;  
j HOS = the number of rural hospitals in the jth province;  
j Expen = the rural residents’ consumption spending in the jth province (¥/person);  
j Sosec = the rural social emergency fund in the jth province (10thousand);  
j Med = the rural residents’ spending on medical care in the jth province (¥/person);  
j Trans = the rural residents’ spending on transportation in the ejth province (¥/person);  
j Edu = the rural residents’ spending on education in the jth province (¥/person);  
j Dummy = Dummy for regions. =1, if the province is in the Eastern area; =2, if it is in the 




The basic regression findings are as follows: 
Table 3  The main regression finding of cross-section analysis: 31 provinces 
  Reg. 1  Reg. 2  Reg. 3  Reg. 4  Reg. 5  Reg. 6  Reg. 7 
C  27.423  167.060 32.657  36.788 184.995 46.887 154.883 
  (4.517)  (3.808) (5.073) (3.913) (4.029) (3.038) (2.745) 
Kj  -0.381  -0.579 -0.036 0.449 -0.280 -0.013 0.049 
  (1.429) (-2.534)  (-0.106)  (1.229)  (-0.952)  (-1.411)  (0.120) 
Nj  0.402  0.525 1.018 0.735 1.040 0.341 0.889 
  (1.670)  (2.591) (2.605) (1.779) (2.977) (1.211) (2.231) 
H0j    -1.370    -1.597  -0.009  -1.289 
   (-2.770)      (-3.063)  (-0.038)  (-2.031) 
H1j    -1.009    1.217  -0.959 
    (-2.404)    (-2.744)  (-1.748) 
H2j    -2.001    -2.154  0.349  -.1709 
   (3.323)      (-3.483)  (-1.217)  (-2.371) 
H5j    -0.535    -0.557  -0.577  -0.464 
   (-1.618)      (-1.722)  (-3.094)  (-1.364) 
HOSj      -0.834 -0.959 -0.727    -0.840 
      (-1.961) (-2.119) (-1.787)    (-1.732) 
Expenj  -0.568    -0.702 -0.723 -0.840    -0.817 
  (-2.932)    (-3.457) (-3.251) (-2.525)    (-2.129) 
So secj      -0.320 -0.408 -0.208    -0.286 
     (-1.246)  (-1525)  (-0.955)    (-1.107) 
Medj       -0.410  -0.001  -0.217 
       (-2.208)  (-0.005)  (-0.993) 
Transj       -0.053  -0.407  -0.038 
       (-0.239)  (-2.085)  (-0.164) 
Eduj       0.206  0.216  0.135 
       (1.247)  (1.307)  (0.723) 
R
2  0.482  0.713 0.557 0.684 0.755 0.682 0.787 
F-Statistic  5.819  6.532 4.810 4.815 5.845 4.757 4.540 
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. All the regressions include dummy for regions. 
 
From the above cross section analysis, we can draw some interesting results. Firstly, if 
we only consider physical investment in rural areas, its effect is insignificantly positive (Re-
gression 1). While taking into account physical capital as well as education level of labor, the 
effect of physical capital becomes even more insignificant (Reg.2). But when we consider 21 
rural spending on medical care, rural consumption etc., the effect of physical capital on eco-
nomic transform becomes very fluctuating (sometime positive, sometimes negative), and 
rather weak. We can conclude that physical capital accumulation is not unique factor for rural 
transform, or even it is not the main factor. 
Secondly, the huge amount of rural labor force is the unavoidable hindrance for rural 
transform. In all the regressions, we find that rural labor force plays significantly negative 
effect on rural transform. That means it is still a tough task for China to move the huge 
amount of surplus rural labor out of traditional agriculture, change their statue, employment 
and living style. 
Thirdly, rural consumption expenditure has significant positive effect on rural transform. 
During the past decade, rural consumption increases sharply in all rural areas with a percep-
tive change in the structure of spending. In 2001, almost in all the provinces, education be-
comes the third largest spending for rural peasants (following the spending on food and hous-
ing), the rural spending on medical care and transportation also increases, and surpasses 
spending on clothing and housing equipment, ranking the fourth and fifth for Eastern area. All 
of these lead to a higher investment in peasants themselves. However, the effect of this kind 
of spending is not so significant due to the former mentioned time-lag. We also find in regres-
sions 4,6 and 7 that spending on education is even weakly negatively related with economic 
transform. The reason is that education costs increase faster in rural areas and even becomes a 
burden for poor peasants. In mid-western poor areas, many peasants can hardly afford the 
rising education costs, which results in higher rates of drop-offs in some areas (especially for 
girls). In this sense, the rural education spending may not mean keeping more rural kids in 
school. 
Fourthly, the increase of rural hospitals has positive effect. With the collapse of coopera-
tive health system, how to keep peasants medically healthier is a big problem. Recently there 
appear lots of private hospitals in addition to collectively held ones, which play helpful role in 
rural areas. The rural social emergency fund also helps, yet not significant enough. That 
means unilateral transfer is not enough to pull peasants out of the trap of poverty. 
Fifthly, there is significant effect of education levels on economic transform. Generally, 
an education as high as “primary school” or “secondary school” is significantly helpful, yet 
the higher education level such as “college and above” has insignificant effect on rural trans-
form (Reg.2,5,7). That is because most peasants with primary or secondary school education 
will work and live in rural areas, while most peasants (or their children) with college or higher 22 
level education will almost definitely refuse to return rural areas. It seems puzzling that in the 
above three regressions, we find the number of “illiterate” peasants even has some “positive 
“effect on transform. What is really going on? Actually, Reg.6 shows that if we only take into 
account several factors regarding rural education, the effect of the extremely low education 
level is neglectable, while the effect of high education level is rather significant, and the nega-
tive effect of rural education spending is also stronger than in other regressions. The possible 
reason lie in that higher education is very expensive for peasants, especially for those in poor 
areas. To raise college tuition, many peasants have to give up other productive spending or 
cut down primary education for other kids in the same family. 
5. Concluding remarks: 
Through the theoretical and empirical analysis, we figure out that to transform the tradi-
tional agricultural economy, different areas in China actually pursue diverse paths. In the 
Eastern areas, peasants are traditionally more concerned about investing in themselves, in-
cluding more schooling, trans-generational transfer of skills and knowledge, more liquidity 
and mobility, more flexibility in their living style and economic activities, etc. Therefore once 
the peasants are given opportunity to accumulate physical capital and expend business, a sig-
nificant take-off and constant economic growth will result. For example, the rural areas in the 
Yangzi River Delta enjoy abundant human capital which has been accumulated for long, 
while the rural areas in the Pearl River Delta enjoy abundant human capital which has immi-
grated from inland China. Both Deltas realize high development during the past two decades, 
whose approach can be described by Path Ⅱ(Figure 5).  
 
In Middle areas, traditional agriculture are well developed from history, peasants also show pas-
sion for investing in human capital. In some provinces (such as Hubei, Hunan, Anhui), rural 
spending on education has become as high as that in the Eastern areas. In the 1980s, the Middle 
areas lagged behind partly because of the geographical disadvantage, partly because of the stag-
nant investment in human capital. As the increase in physical capital accumulation, this area will 
pay more attention to investment in human capital, and it can pursue a transform path like   
Path III.  
 
The Western area is located further inland; it is natural resources abundant and notori-
ously poor. On the one hand, peasants have limited capability to invest in themselves. On the 
other hand, the existent human capital moves to eastern and middle areas, which makes the 
lackness of human capital even more serious. Meanwhile, central and local government con-
sistently emphasizes the weakness of infrastructure in the west, and increase physical capital 23 
accumulation as a prescription for poverty. As a result, the limitation of human capital gets 
even worse, which in turn constrains the possibility of take-off. Therefore, it is better for the 
Western rural China to pursue the path Ⅳ, i.e. the area can increase human capital investment 
faster even at the cost of physical capital accumulation, so that there may be better a match 
between physical and human capital, until it realizes its take-off.  
Most poverty counties and poverty population are concentrated in the 12 “Big-
Development” provinces, transform traditional rural economy is closely related with the task 
of poverty relief. The per capita income, per capita consumption of these provinces are not 
only much lower than those of urban areas, but also much lower than those of rural average 
levels, which constitute a full picture of income poverty and consumption poverty. However, 
more attention should by paid to the reason for the perverse poverty. There is a sharp lackness 
of medical infrastructure, little social insurance in the west; the rural spending on medical 
care, transportation and education is also much lower than average level, which means limited 
capability of investing in rural people. On the other hand, the official investment on human 
capital is obviously inadequate. Take education for example
5, according to national education 
budget statistics in 1999, in the national poverty counties, the education per primary school 
student is 65.4% of that of urban average level, 69% of that of rural average level. The corre-
sponding education budget for per secondary school student id 61.2% of that of urban average 
level, the extra-budgetary education fund per secondary student is only 45.9% of that of urban 
average level and 70% of the rural average level. Actually, the income or consumption pov-
erty in the 12 “Big-Development” provinces is just an evidence or poverty, while the source 
for poverty lies in the lackness of capability or incentive to invest on human capital. The pov-
erty regarding education, medical care, social insurance and economic opportunity can be 
defined as “capability poverty”. It is the capability poverty that results in the trap of the low 
level equilibrium in traditional agricultural economy. The policy implication is obvious. We 
should pay more attention on human capital accumulation in poverty rural areas, and try to get 
more human capital involved in the western development (for example, attracting newly 
graduated college students to work in the western areas for some time or for long). A higher 
and constantly increasing level of human capital and its match with physical capital is the key 




                                                 
5 The original data of the investigation can be referred to Wang Rong: “On the equality of compulsory education 
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